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BIBLICAL JUSTICE AND MODERN 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY 
Arthur F. Holmes 
Recent writing on the concept of justice continues an Enlightenment tradition 
which departed markedly from the Biblical and classical heritage. Paradoxically, 
some segments of the Christian community have canonized that Enlightenment 
tradition, particularly its political and economic application, and tell us it had 
Biblical roots that America must recover. But if modem moral philosophy indeed 
departed from the Judao-Christian tradition, that kind of rerooting is a mistake. 
I want to highlight those departures, and in the process to point constructive 
directions, not for rerooting but for reconstructing a concept of justice, one that 
is more in keeping with the tradition of the Old Testament law and prophets 
(and certain aspects of classical philosophy) than with the philosophers of the 
Enlightenment. 
The Enlightenment kind of paradigm, is represented by Immanuel Kant in 
The Metaphysics of Morals. 
The [moral] concept of justice ... applies only under the following 
conditions. First, it applies only to the external and ... practical 
relationship of one person to another in which their actions can in fact 
exert an influence on each other directly or indirectly. Second, the 
concept applies only to the relationship of a will to another person's 
will, not to his wishes or desires (or even just his needs), which are the 
concern of acts of benevolence and charity. Third, the concept of justice 
does not take into consideration the content of the will, that is, the end 
that a person intends to accomplish by means of the object that he 
wills .... Instead, in applying the concept of justice we take into 
consideration only the form of the relationship between the wills insofar 
as they are regarded as free, and whether the action of one of them can 
be conjoined with the freedom of the other in accordance with a universal 
law. 1 
I want to look at this statement of Kant's in the light of four features of the 
Biblical paradigm, features which find closer parallels in classical than in modem 
moral philosophy. 
1. The first of these Biblical features is the relationship between justice and 
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the law of God. God's ordinances are just judgments (one and the same root 
word is sometimes used for all three of those terms). The Mosaic legislation 
was to provide a more just society, and the prophets who preached justice called 
Israel back to the law of God. Justice and the law of God go hand in hand, in 
much the same fashion as our talk of God-given natural rights implies that respect 
for persons is a God-given obligation. 
Several implications follow. First, the law of God applies equally to all, the 
wealthy and the powerful as well as the poor and the powerless. In fact again 
and again the powerful are called to account for oppressing people. Justice means 
treating people equitably, equal rights before the law. God is in that sense "no 
respecter of persons." This of course was a strength of the Enlightenment tradition. 
A second implication is the deontological nature of justice commanded by 
God. This is lacking in many modem approaches-witness Elizabeth Anscombe' s 
complaint that the notion of duty had lost its moorings, so that the concept of 
moral law was systematically excluded from modem moral philosophy. 2 But 
Immanuel Kant's thoroughly deontological emphasis is reflected not only in the 
last clause of the statement I have quoted ("in accordance with universal law"), 
but also in the exclusions of his second condition: the concept of justice "applies 
only to the relationship of a will to another person's will, not to his wishes or 
desires or ... needs." The third condition adds "ends," thereby seeming to 
exclude all teleological considerations rooted in the nature either of human 
persons or of God. 
Yet the classical and Biblical traditions were not as exclusively deontological 
as Kant seems at first to be. They were also teleological. Aristotle himself says 
"in one sense we call acts just that tend to produce and preserve happiness . 
Aquinas' definition of law includes a final cause. Law is: 
an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has 
the care of the community, and promulgated. 4 
And he goes on in The Treatise on Law to define ajust law by reference to that end. 5 
This teleological aspect of justice is a third implication of its relation to Divine 
moral law and the one I want to stress most. Biblically, God's purpose in just 
laws relates to the kingdom of Shalom of which the Hebrew poets and prophets 
and the gospel speak. The content of the moral law is thus not an arbitrary 
imposition but, granted the nature of human persons and their relationships, it 
is essential to human wellbeing and so to Shalom. As I understand the concept, 
Shalom includes not only the absence of civil and international violence, not 
only the absence of oppression, not only equitable treatment for all persons, but 
also economic sufficiency for everyone ("they shall sit every man under his vine 
and under his fig tree" - Mic.4:4) and a human flourishing, combined with moral 
virtue, that elicits thankful celebration and sheer delight in God's creation. 
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But is a teleological notion altogether lacking in Kant? In his stated conditions 
regarding justice, yes. But what about his allusions to the kingdom of God in 
Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone? In that context, I find no reference 
to justice, although it is implied in the claim in book three that the kingdom of 
God is not a juridical state but an ethical state where non-coercive laws of virtue 
rule within each member of the commonwealth. If for Kant a virtuous person 
wills that end, her just decisions will have at least tacit reference thereto, whatever 
more immediate ends she might have considered. 6 
My point here is not that Kant's idea of the Kingdom of God is the Biblical 
ideal, nor that his concept of justice has that moral content. The point is rather 
twofold. First, if justice is tied to the Kingdom ideal, then justice is a teleological 
conception; and if justice is tied to divine law, then it is deontological also, and 
not the purely utilitarian concept which Mill made it. Second, the identification 
of justice with divine moral law and its consequent relation to a Kingdom of 
Shalom gives it content rather than form alone-something Kant's third condition 
denies: Kant's conception of the kingdom assumes that justice is a formal concept 
only. I return to this point later. 
2. The second Biblical feature is that justice is primarily virtue, personal 
righteousness, and secondarily a quality of actions, decisions, and laws. Two 
Hebrew words are used. Mishpat refers to decisions, judgments or actions, 
particularly in juridical, political or economic contexts: we read, for instance, 
of doing justice as against perverting judgment, of the Lord's judgments being 
right, and of just weights and measures. The Septuagint and the New Testament 
translate it with krisis, and use the verb anakrino. I shall call this justice of 
judgments and actions "M-justice." 
In contrast, the Hebrew term tsadeq (which I shall refer to as T -justice) speaks 
of personal righteousness. We read of a just God, and the patriarch Noah is 
referred to as a just man. T-justice includes devout faith and obedience to God's 
ordinances (M-justice): it therefore seeks M-justice for the oppressed. It is even 
ascribed to weights and balances, extending to them the unbiassed trustworthiness 
of personal rectitude. Overall, T-justice points to moral character as the inner 
telos of one's life. 7 No higher or more encompassing credential can be given 
than to pronounce someone righteous. T-justice says it all. 
The parallel to Aristotle is obvious. The supreme good, the unifying inner 
telos of a person's life which he calls happiness, is the cultivation of excellence 
or virtue. Justice in his "universal" sense, "virtue entire," is lawabidingness, 
"that kind of state of character which makes people disposed to do what is just, 
and makes them act justly and wish for what is just."8 "The just is the lawful 
and the fair."9 This sounds much like the Biblical T-justice. Aristotle's particular 
justice, while still a virtue, comes close to M-justice, for there he addresses 
particular actions with which justice as virtue will properly be concerned. T -justice 
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is exhibited in doing acts of M-justice. What Aristotle lacks, of course, is the 
pervasively religious character of T -justice. 
Justice as inner virtue is forgotten in much of modem moral philosophy. But 
what about Kant in this regard? In his case the picture is more ambiguous. "The 
moral concept of justice," he has told us, "applies only to the external and 
practical." And part 2 of The Metaphysics of Morals, in which he addresses the 
virtues, makes no mention of justice as a virtue. Virtue has to do with the self 
constraint of a rational being in obeying his duty, quite apart from inner inclination 
or desire. It is thus a duty to promote the wellbeing of others, but not out of 
benevolence nor out of T-justice, unless of course we equate T-justice with 
simply acting out of respect of duty. 
3. The third feature of the Biblical (and classical) paradigm concerns justice 
as social responsibility . We observed earlier that the Biblical concept of justice 
has to do with responsibility to the moral law of God and to its purpose of 
Shalom. But Shalom is a societal thing, having to do with economic and political 
as well as individual and interpersonal matters. Justice therefore has to do with 
social responsibility. The prophets see M-justice as relieving the oppressed, and 
look for it in the operation of the judicial system and of good government. 
M-justice is not something apart from loving mercy: it stands up for the poor, 
the fatherless, and the cheated. It implements now, to whatever degree possible, 
the equitable social ideals of the Kingdom. 
Christian ethicists tend to emphasize the intrinsic value of each individual 
created in God's image. Said Augustine, "by nature, as God first created us, no 
one is the slave either of man or of sin. "10 But M-justice implies more than 
simply respect for individuals as persons and their individual liberty . For persons 
in God's image are God's representatives in this world,entrusted with the care 
of his creation, serving God's purpose in this world. Their responsible stewardship 
in all the relationships of life is involved, responsible agency. M-justice amounts 
to acting responsibly towards others for the sake of Shalom. 
In the Enlightenment tradition, on the other hand, justice is related primarily 
to individual rights and liberties. John Locke's state of nature, for example, was 
one of complete freedom, without even the responsibilities of marriage and 
family, let alone citizenship, and the individual's right to freedom must always 
be preserved. And Immanuel Kant reduces the distinctive concerns of justice to 
individual freedom of will. That emphasis is clear enough in his three conditions 
I cited above, but see also how he states the universal principle of justice: 
Every action is just that in itself or its maxim is such that freedom of 
the will of each can co-exist together with a universal law. II 
Or again, under the subheading, "There is Only One Innate Right": 
Freedom (independence from the constraint of another's will), insofar 
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as it is compatible with the freedom of everyone else in accordance 
with a universal law, is the sole and original right that belongs to every 
human being by nature of his humanity. 12 
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Kant's ideal kingdom of autonomous moral wills rules all else. The emphasis 
is on the right to liberty alone, rather than on broader aspects of justice as 
responsibility for Shalom. It is as if the inner telos of one's life is complete 
freedom, not moral virtue, and freedom alone brings happiness; and the social 
telos, insofar as there is one, is the maximization of every individual's freedom. 
No larger goal, no other moral concerns, no richer wellbeing is suggested. In 
the words of Rawls' first principle of justice: 
... each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive liberty 
compatible with a similar liberty for others. 13 
The real worth of this Enlightenment tradition must not be minimized: it is 
the insistence on equitability, each and every person having equal rights, in 
contrast to tyrannical practices and to the aristocratic structure of the Greek 
political scene. Yet the concept of freedom has gone awry. First, it is a negative 
freedom, freedom from something, rather than a positive freedom to something. 
The lack of that teleological element in justice carries over into freedom. Bibli-
cally, on the other hand, freedom is not political or economic autonomy, not 
primarily at least, nor is it simply freedom from the tyranny of sin, essential 
though that is to the overall picture. Freedom is rather freedom to serve responsibly 
from the heart, freedom to act for Shalom. Freedom reduced to individual negative 
freedom is not M-justice; nor is a kingdom of autonomous wills per se the 
kingdom of Shalom. 
The difference goes back to the underlying views of persons. Biblically, a 
person is by nature a relational being, divinely entrusted with responsibility for 
nature and for other persons. 14 She finds identity and purpose in relationships 
and responsibilities. For Aristotle, too, a person is by nature a social animal, 
with social responsibilities. The Enlightenment understanding was far more indi-
vidualistic, influenced as it was by the atomistic picture of the physical world. 
That much is widely recognized, but some critics go further. In The Political 
Theory of Possessive Individualism, a study of the roots of liberal-democratic 
theory from Hobbes to Locke, C. B. MacPherson reports that the individual was 
regarded as sole proprietor of his own person and capacities, owing nothing to 
society for them. The individual is neither a moral whole, nor part of a larger 
social whole, but is an independent atom, owner of himself. Society then is a 
collection of free individuals relating to each other as do property owners, and 
a political society is a calculated device for the protection of this property and 
for an orderly relation of exchange. IS Neither property ownership nor labor as 
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such, it seems, involve any positive social responsibility. 
Locke traced property ownership to mixing one's labor with the lands God 
provided, adding the proviso that since God's providence is for all one should 
leave enough for others. But this overlooks the fact that the life and ability labor 
requires are equally God's provision too. Even my labor is not my own private 
possession. Biblically, the earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof, including 
my labor: this means that economic activity and economic justice are alike matters 
of responsible stewardship rather than of freedom in regards to acquisition and 
entitlement rights. 
In parallel fashion, Aristotle distinguished between natural and unnatural prop-
erty acquisition, in terms of its purpose or final cause. I6 It is not simply how 
something is acquired that is morally significant, but also why, for what end? 
This teleological element, in the Biblical picture, keeps freedom from being just 
a negative concept, negative rights. 
But a second point remains regarding M-justice as social responsibility, and 
regarding social structures. Enlightenment individualism developed contractarian 
social and political theories: wholly free individuals agree out of "enlightened" 
self-interest to structure the community in freedom-restricting ways. From a 
Biblical point of view again difficulties arise, depending on how seriously the 
contractarian notion is taken. On the one hand, social contract may simply be 
a way of speaking about the consent of the governed, and with that I have no 
quarrel. Aquinas may not be the final authority in all matters offaith and practice, 
but he does observe that the consent of the whole people can count more than 
the authority of the sovereign. 17 On the other hand contractarians speak about 
economic and political matters as if the ultimate source of all power lies in totally 
free individuals who, in Paul Ramsey's words, "remain as atomistic as before. "18 
Listen to Kant: 
The act by means of which the people constitute themselves a state is 
the original contract. More properly it is the idea of that act that also 
enables us to conceive of the legitimacy of the state. [That sounds like 
a necessary and sufficient condition.] According to the original contract, 
all the people give up their external freedom in order to take it back 
again immediately as members of a commonwealth. 19 
Aristotle on the other hand recognized that we are by nature political animals. 
It is by nature that families and civil society exist. And Biblically, family and 
work and government, as well as the church, are ordained by God as Shalom-con-
tributing structures of human life. This I take to underlie the Christian natural 
law jurisprudence and political theory from which modem moral and social 
philosophy departed. Theologians also speak of creation orders or mandates with 
intrinsic ends that are not dependent only on human will and contract. 20 Justice 
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as social responsibility exercised by institutional means, is still responsibility for 
Shalom. 
4. The final feature of the Biblical (and classical) paradigm which I want to 
stress concerns the content of M -justice. The theory of human rights is of course 
one way of spelling that out, but how we define those rights will obviously 
depend on what we think about human persons. 
(1) To begin with, if we emphasize that we are all equally persons (or equally 
in God's image, or some similar formula), then with the Enlightenment tradition 
we will emphasize equal human rights. Plato and Aristotle avoided this inference 
because their views of persons included the aristocracy of reason, which accorded 
to some more rights and privileges than others. Aristotle claimed that those who 
have not the rational ability to rule themselves are "by nature" slaves. 21 A more 
egalitarian note is struck by Francisco da Vitoria in his treatment of just war. 
The Indians are equally human beings in God's image, and so should be accorded 
equal rights with the Spaniards, despite differences of race, religion and degree 
of civilization. 22 
John Rawls' second principle in its revised formulation is also egalitarian, 
although it goes further. 
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached 
to offices or positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity.23 
Rawls plainly recognizes that we may be equally persons but unequal in other 
regards, like necessities and opportunities in life. He treats such things as matters 
of justice too, as related to rights, for more needs saying than just the near 
tautology that all persons have equal worth as persons and should therefore be 
accorded equal human rights. 
(2) On the other hand, we have seen that if we make individual freedom of 
the will the essential characteristic of persons, as Kant did, then justice applies 
to the relationship of a will to another person's will, not to his wishes 
or desires (or even just his needs), which are the concern of acts of 
benevolence or charity. 
In that case, only negative rights will be stressed, the right not to be forced 
against my will, hence not to suffer involuntary violence or intrusion by others. 
In Nozick's terms, it means that ajust acquisition gives the individual permanent 
and unqualified property rights, as long as that acquisition does not prevent 
others from freely utilizing their own previous acquisitions. 2. 
Noticeably an emphasis on negative rights pervades the Old Testament-its 
repudiation of extortion, unjust violence, discrimination against the powerless, 
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and, in general, oppression. Some have supposed that poverty in ancient Israel 
was due to the fact that the tribal economy, established by land distribution after 
the settling of Canaan , broke down with the emergence of an oppressive monarchy 
on the model of other Oriental potentates. In that case, providing for the poor 
was a form of compensatory justice, based on negative rights. But as Herbert 
Schlossberg points out, that would not mean that all poverty is always due to 
oppression. 2s What oflife's necessities in those cases? Are they, as Kant asserts 
and Nozick implies, to be left to charity? Is that just, in terms of justice as 
responsibility for Shalom? 
The conception of persons as responsible agents, stewards of God's creation, 
points in the direction of positive rights. Emil Brunner claims that human rights 
are necessary to fulfilling the end to which the human person is created. 26 And 
Max Stackhouse cites the United Church of Christ pronouncement: 
... the fundamental human right which gives the human being his or 
her dignity is also an obligation to serve and to help in the creation of 
the conditions for life in the whole creation. The fundamental human 
right is the right to be responsible to God. . .. rights are given by 
God as the means for all human beings to fulfil their duties before God's 
righteousness. 
Thus human rights are what people need in order to fulfil their funda-
mental task of becoming a human person, that is fulfilling their calling 
as the image of God. 27 
Notice where this leads. Kant says (again in that long statement of conditions); 
the concept of justice does not take into account the content of the will, 
that is, the end that a person intends to accomplish by means of the 
object that he wills ... [but] only the form of the relationship between 
the wills insofar as they are regarded as free . . . . 
If justice is so defined with basic reference to freedom, it provides only a formal 
principle, not a content of moral responsibility. But the connection between 
justice and moral law, along with the teleological element in justice as respon-
sibility for Shalom, does give content. Hence, justice cannot be defined Biblically 
with Kant-like reduction to freedom and so to negative rights alone. Kant, I take 
it, is mistaken about all three conditions in his concept of justice, and with him 
today's Enlightenment-type ethicists who adopt his paradigm. (a) Justice as a 
moral concept does not apply only to the external and to actions, but also to 
inner virtue. (b) Justice is not only, nor primarily, a matter of individual negative 
freedom, for it relates to the end of Shalom. (c) Justice does have content, not 
just form. 
What sort of content, beyond the requirement of equitable treatment, and 
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therefore freedom from oppression, is implicit in the concept of justice as acting 
responsibly for Shalom? Consider Alan Gewirth's claim that an agent, pursuing 
her own action projects claims rights which are essential to successful action: 
universalized by his Principle of Generic Consistency, all prospective purposive 
agents have such rights. Gewirth goes on to talk of basic rights to the necessary 
conditions for perforn1ing any or all actions, in distinction from less needful 
non-subtractive rights, loss of which would lower one's level of purpose fulfil-
ment, and still lower priority additive rights that would raise that level. 28 
The analogy is obvious except that my case is cast in a Biblical context. If 
M-justice means acting responsibly for Shalom, it presupposes the right to what 
is necessary to acting responsibly for Shalom. 
(3) What then is the necessitarian element in M-justice, conceived as acting 
responsibly for Shalom? First, it includes what is needful economically, emotion-
ally and educationally for one to function as a contributing member of society. 
Second, it includes the freedom to engage in constructive activities, and to 
participate in the institutional life of society (for social institutions, as I suggested 
earlier, should also contribute responsibly towards Shalom). Hence the right to 
marry and raise children, the right to do useful and satisfying work, the right to 
constructive political involvement. This plainly goes beyond sustenance rights 
and negative freedom. 
M-justice is therefore not simply a matter of preserving individual rights and 
freedoms, although it includes those freedoms required for contributing to 
Shalom. It points in a less individualistic and more socially responsible direction 
than much of modem moral philosophy. As a result, liberation movements 
become ultimately social responsibility movements. "Women's lib" means 
women are free and able to become more societally involved and responsible. 
Academic freedom expands into both the right and the responsibility to work on 
socialIy significant problems (that may not at present be professionally reward-
ing). Justice means more than freedom, more than treating people fairly. It has 
positive societal intent. Its concern for the oppressed is not just for their lack of 
individual freedoms, but for their larger lack of Shalom and their inability to 
contribute to Shalom. 
Whether people will in fact act responsibly to this end-peace, both civil and 
international, economic sufficiency and equitable treatment for all persons, and 
a human flourishing that elicits thankfulness, celebration and delight-that is 
another question. Three factors might prevent them: lack of the necessities it 
would require, lack of freedom to do so, or lack of virtue. The first two of these, 
I have argued, are matters of M-justice itself. The third is a matter of T-justice. 
In effect, then, the four features I have identified in the Biblical paradigm are 
parts of a coherent whole. Justice, let me rep¥at, is (a) like the law of God in 
that it (b) relates to virtue as well as to (c) the necessities for a life of positive 
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freedom in (d) the service of Shalom. 
Finally, there are two questions I have not addressed: how society might be 
structured in the interests of M-justice, and how it might work out in business, 
environmental, medical, political and other areas of applied ethics. I have tried 
only to show how M-justice differs from some more familiar influential views, 
not how its requirements might be met in practice. 
Wheaton College (fL) 
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